ST201 The Anatomy Lesson and Personal Identity

Locke and Parfit on personal identity

The memory theory, the objections to it, and Parfit's claim that identity is not what matters.

About 180 minutes. Free to read. You only need an account to keep notes and submit assignments.

Reading for this lesson

Introduction

What makes you the same person you were ten years ago? Not your body, most of whose cells have been replaced. Not your beliefs, many of which have changed. John Locke's answer, in the chapter on identity he added to his Essay in 1694, was consciousness: you are the same person as far back as your memory reaches[1]. The answer has obvious problems (we forget; memories can be false; a being with your memories might not be you), and the debate they started has run for three centuries.

Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (1984) is the modern landmark[2]. Using thought experiments about teletransportation and divided brains, Parfit argues that personal identity is not what matters. What matters is psychological continuity and connectedness, the chains of memory, intention and character that link a person over time, and these can hold without identity and fail with it.

"The Anatomy Lesson" appeared in the same year. It is, read philosophically, a Parfitian thought experiment drawn by Bissette and Totleben: a being with Alec Holland's memories and no other connection to him. This week gives you the terms.

What you are studying

Two philosophical texts and the discipline of reading philosophy: slowly, for the argument, testing each step.

Learning objectives

  • Summarise Locke's memory theory and the standard objections to it.
  • Summarise Parfit's distinction between identity and what matters.
  • Apply both to the case of a being with a dead man's memories.

Key concepts

Locke's memory criterion

For Locke, a person is a thinking being that can consider itself as itself across time, and personal identity extends as far as consciousness (memory) does[1]. Note his famous cases: the prince and the cobbler, the drunk and the sober man. Then note the problem the Anatomy Lesson raises: the creature remembers being Alec Holland. On Locke's criterion, is he?

Parfit and what matters

Parfit's teletransporter destroys you on Earth and builds an exact copy on Mars with all your memories. Is the copy you? Parfit's answer is that the question is empty: what matters is that the copy is psychologically continuous with you, and that relation can hold whether or not we call the copy "you"[2]. Apply it: the creature is psychologically continuous with Holland through memory. Does it matter whether he is Holland?

Reading philosophy

Philosophy is read by reconstructing the argument: premises, steps, conclusion. Write Parfit's argument as a numbered list. Then find the step you would deny.

Questions to think about while reading

  • What does Locke say about a person who forgets an action? Is he still responsible for it?
  • What is Parfit's Relation R, and what does he say about its holding to a lesser degree?
  • Which of Parfit's thought experiments is closest to the creature's situation?

Things to notice

  • Both philosophers use stories. Notice how a thought experiment is a very short fiction with a question attached.
  • Parfit's conclusion is meant to be consoling. Does it console the creature?
  • The dates. 1984 for both Parfit and Moore. Coincidence, or something in the air?

Reflection questions

  • On Locke's view, is Swamp Thing Alec Holland? On Parfit's, does the question matter?
  • Which answer would the creature want to be true?

Homework and tasks

Write four hundred words applying Parfit to the creature: does Relation R hold between Alec Holland and the thing in the swamp, in what degree, and what follows for how the creature should feel about himself.

Next lesson

Next week: the humans. Abby, Matt Cable and the Monkey King, and how the people around the creature carry the story's themes.

References

  1. John Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, chapter 27, "Of Identity and Diversity". 1690 (chapter added in the second edition, 1694). Source requires verification
  2. Derek Parfit. Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press, 1984.

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